Instructions for Identification, Protection and Production of Data

This is a new data collection effort to identify, protect and, as appropriate, to produce information held in TSA and FAA files concerning the, so-called, shoe-bomber incident on December 22, 2001 or relating to Richard Colvin Reid (*a.k.a.*, Abdul-Raheem, Abu Ibrahim Abdul Raheem, Abdul Raheem, Abu Ibrahim, Abdel Raheem, Tariq Raja) who has been charged in connection with this incident.

The information must be identified both to support information needs of the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney. It must include all information on the matter to include anything that is exculpatory as well as any information that could be used by the prosecution.

In this effort TSA Special Actions and Litigation Support Staff (formerly ACS-90) is representing both FAA and TSA and is authorized to task the FAA and TSA elements involved. This data collection will require cooperation and direct responses to all elements holding relevant records: Responses, to include negative replies by entities which locate no responsive records are requested from: FAA (ACO-300), TSIS, TSA Policy (ACP), and the following TSA Aviation Operations elements: ACO-300 (FAA), ACO-500, ACO-600 Watch, ACS-50, ANE-700, ASO-700, BOS CASFO, International (AEU-700, CASLO-London, and CASLO-Paris), MIA CASFO. TSA/Chief Technical Officer (Attn: Dr. Malotky) is also asked to provide information.

Tasked offices should not obtain any new records or documents from outside entities based on this tasking. The <u>only</u> documents which must be identified and, if applicable, produced are those <u>already in the possession</u> of TSA and FAA.

The suspense date for data collection is May 17, 2002. Request by that date that all documents responsive to this request be identified, protected from destruction or transfer out of the control of the respondent and, as applicable, copied and forwarded to TSA Aviation Operations, Attention Special Actions and Litigation Support Staff, Room 300E, FOB 10A, 800 Independence Ave SW, Washington D.C. 20591 through appropriate channels.

1. Subject Matter:

> For TSA Policy: Please identify all information related to specific policy decisions, security directives, emergency amendments, or threat assessments connected in any way to the incident involving Reid, *regardless of date*, in relation to Richard Reid (including any of his known aliases) and/or the events of December 22, 2001. Please also provide any information on any swabbing or other activities by Mr. Tony Fainberg.

> For TSIS:

- Specific threats against, and threat assessments of, U.S. civil aviation in effect on December 21 and 22, 2001.

- Information from CAPPS, ICAPPS or any other selectee identification system in use for December 22, 2001 for American Airlines Flight #63 (Paris to Miami).

- Information from CAPPS, ICAPPS and any other selectee identification system for December 21, 2001 for the American Airlines Flight (Paris to Miami) that Richard Reid was prevented from boarding.

- All information on the incident in question captured in any ICF or other form.

- For TSA Av Ops elements(ACO-500, ACO-600, ANE-700, AEU-700, ASO-700, Brussels CASIFO, Miami CASFO and CASIFO, CASLO-London, CASLO-Paris, ACS-30 and Boston CASFO):

  - All information related to the events of December 22, 2001, at Paris, while airborne other information concerning Reid, his travels or itinerary available at Miami International Airport (ASO-700 & Miami CASFO). Also: AEU personnel, CASLO-Paris, and CASLO-London. Also any information on Reid, his associates and activities at any time.

- For TSA Av Ops, Explosives Program (ACS-50): Any information related to Richard Reid, the explosive device and the events of December 22, 2001. If information held is controlled by FBI as part of a continuing criminal investigation, please provide a generic description of the type of data held.

- From FAA ACO-300, name check for Richard Colvin Reid and any of his known aliases.

- For ACO-500, AEU-700 and CASLO-Paris: Please note that we also need information on any unique current security requirements and procedures which were in effect at Paris, or for US carriers at Paris, or specifically involving American Airlines Flight #63. This information should include, but is not limited to: Security screening checkpoint activities, including CCTV video files for December 21 and 22, 2001, any use of advanced technology equipment such as Threat Image Projection (TIP) and explosives trace detectors.

- For TSA Chief Technical Officer: Request Dr. Malotky (ACS-20) provide any information relative to this matter.

2. Material NOT Required for Production:

- All entities do not need to report or produce any open source media reporting, press, radio, tv etc. or any other information and documents available in the public domain such as copies of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).

- Field elements do not need to identify or produce Security Directives, emergency amendments or other official documents d herein.

- Those documents will be produced by the respective element. However if a field element received information on this incident from a headquarters or any

other field element which is not tasked herein, that information should be identified in your response.

- Documents which have already been provided to FBI must be identified and if possible the FBI point of contact which received the documents should be identified, but you do not need to make and forward a copy of such documents unless specifically tasked to do so.

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3. General Instructions for Production and Storage:

• Inventory all documents holdings for responsive documents.

• Ignore public source documents and documents transmitted from another element tasked herein

• List, to include full name of document, originator, any file number and date any documents already provided to FBI. Provide this list as part of your response to the TSA Special Actions Staff.

• List with full identifying data all classified documents produced by any other agency. If the list is unclassified, include it with your response. If list itself is classified, provide list by appropriate means to TSIS attention Steffanie Staufer and advise the Special Actions Staff by unclassified message that a classified list has been forwarded to TSIS.

• Hold all classified documents and items previously provided to FBI until advised if you need to forward them.

• Copy all remaining documents for copying and send them directly to The TSA Special Actions and Litigation Support Staff (formerly ACS-90).

4. Specific Instructions

• Unclassified Hard copy documents:

  • Photocopy three (3) copies and forward by expeditious means.

  • Segregate and store all original documents in a secure location. Label files containing original documents:

    "U.S. versus Richard Reid" Contact TSA Special Actions & Litigation Support Staff before Transferring or Destroying."

• Unclassified Electronic copies of documents and email (please remove personal passwords, if any).

  • Copy documents to two floppy disks or CD-ROM's and label both disks: **"U.S. versus Richard Reid (data provided by {insert name of staff member}). Contact TSA Special Actions before Transferring or Destroying."**

- For offices outside of Hqs TSA/FAA: Forward one disk and store the other disk in a secure location with other original Reid Litigation Documentation.

- Note: As an alternative procedure, for offices outside of TSA/FAA headquarters: if only a small number of e-documents of relatively short length are to be forwarded, they may be forwarded as attachments to email sent to Michelle Salinas at her headquarters email address. Please insure, however, that receipt has been acknowledged.

- For offices within TSA/FAA headquarters: You will receive additional guidance on an alternative way to capture and forward relevant email and electronic documents already stored on the hqs email and lan systems.

- Note for all elements regarding email. Both incoming and outgoing messages are required to include any attachments. It is sufficient to provide only the final version in a chain of correspondence that includes all transmittals and attachments.